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Abstract—In the paper we present a simple threshold decryp-
tion system based on the RSA cryptosystem. Our model avoids
the application of the Shamir secret sharing protocol and is
based only on the Chinese reminder theorem. The flexibility
in the threshold level is attained due to the suitable prepara-
tion of the input data. The second part of the article describes
a modification of the basic model, which admits the sender’s
impact on the choice of the real receiver’s group.
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1. Introduction
Threshold cryptography is one of the most important di-
rections in modern cryptology. The basic idea is the divi-
sion of the private key (used to decrypt or sign the mes-
sages) into shares, such that at least the given number of
them (called the threshold level) is necessary to its recon-
struction. This allows to distribute the trust or responsiblity
over the group members who are involved in the decryp-
tion or signing process, respectively. On the other hand, the
distributed data or services allow to increase their availabil-
ity, reliability or security.
The potential draw-back of the threshold cryptosystems
(particularly in the encryption systems) is the lack of ﬂexi-
bility in the threshold level aspect. However in many appli-
cations the messages have diﬀerent “priorities” or impor-
tance. In this connection we should require that some data
should have higher threshold level than the others. In the
classical approach this implies the necessity of generation
of several polynomial threshold sharing protocols each re-
sponsible for the diﬀerent threshold level. Recently there
were some attempts to partially solve this problem (see,
e.g., [1], [2], [3]) in the digital signature context.
As concerns the threshold decryption systems, very inter-
esting solution was presented by H. Ghodosi, J. Pieprzyk,
R. Safavi-Naini [4]. They apply the RSA (Rivest, Shamir,
Adleman) cryptosystem [5] together with the Chinese re-
minder theorem (CRT) and the Shamir secret sharing pro-
tocol [6] to obtain the ﬂexibility of the threshold level in
dynamic group decryption process.
The Shamir protocol allowed the sender to share the “ses-
sion key” among the members of the corresponding de-
cryption group. In [7] the application of the above model
for the databases systems was presented.
In this paper we were able to avoid the application of
Shamir protocol completely, while still keeping the pos-
sibility to vary the threshold level together with the en-
crypted messages. In view of the additional “formatting”
conditions concerning the encrypted data, our model is
based only on the RSA cryptosystem and Chinese remain-
der theorem.
2. Mathematical Background
2.1. Chinese Reminder Theorem
Given the pairwise coprime positive integers n1, n2, . . . , nk
and any integers a1, a2, . . . , ak one can compute the inte-
ger a satisfying the following conditions:
a ≡ ai mod ni (for i = 1,2, . . . ,k).


























y j = z−1j mod n j .
2.2. RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem may be applied for the data encryp-
tion process as well as to the digital signatures. It’s security
is based on the factorization problem (for positive integers),
which is believed to be computationally hard.
Parameters of RSA encryption scheme
Public key – (e,N) and private key d,
N = p ·q (p,q are prime numbers),
ϕ(N) = (p−1) · (q−1),
e – a number coprime to ϕ(N),
d – a number satisfyig the condition:
e ·d ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N).
To encrypt the message m we compute the cryptogram c =
me mod N. To decrypt the ciphertext c we compute the
value m = cd mod N.
More information concerning the RSA cryptosystems may
be found in [5] and [8].
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2.3. Dynamic threshold decryption
The idea of the threshold decryption cryptosystem is based
on the splitting of the decryption key into several parts
called the shares, which are applied for the reconstruction of
the plaintext from the given ciphertext. The shares attached
to the group members result in the fact that the decryption
process has to be done collectively.
The typical threshold decryption systems use Lagrange in-
terpolation formula to reconstruct the secret (being the
free coeﬃcient of the corresponding polynomial) from the
shares being its values in positive integers. The degree
of the polynomial deﬁnes the minimal number of shares
needed to reconstruct the secret value. Thus the change of
the threshold level causes the requirement of a new random
polynomial to be generated and the corresponding shares to
be distributed among the decryption group members. This
makes the traditional approach to such systems completely
impractical especially when the dynamic groups are con-
sidered. The solution proposed in [4] makes the sender
responsible for the corresponding polynomial choice and
pointing out the group of receivers of a given message, by
means of some kind of “session keys”. As a result the
ﬂexibility of the threshold level (depending on the mes-
sage) is admissible. Moreover the impact of the sender on
the choice of the “decryption” group is achieved. The more
general dynamic decryption group model admitting the dis-
tribution of the same shares among the distinct members
(c.f. [9], [10]) or hierarchical model (c.f. [11]) could be
also considered within the similiar framework.
In this paper we present the simple threshold decryption
protocol which avoids the application of the Shamir secret
sharing protocol, still keeping the ﬂexibility of the corre-
sponding threshold level in the decryption process. It was
possible due to the suitable preparation (representation) of
the data, according to the assumed threshold level, before
its encryption by the public keys of the decryption group
members. In the decryption phase we use the correspond-
ing private keys and the shares of the plaintext to recon-
struct the original message.
3. Model
3.1. Notation
Let G = {P1, ...,Pn} be the group of users equipped with
RSA keys (di,(ei,Ni)), respectively.
Let us assume that the RSA moduli Ni are localized in the
intervals:
(∗) Ni ∈ (2i−1N0,2iN0) for i = 1,2, ...,n
and K be a ﬁxed number (security parameter) satisfying the
inequality:
(∗∗) 2log2 log2 N0 < K <
log2 N0
10 .
The communication among the group G goes through
the group message board (GMB), where all the decrypted
fragments of the message are published. The access to
the GMB requires RSA keys so only the members of G
can read and write in GMB.















Yj = (N j)−1mod N .
3.2. Data Preparation
Let ⌊x⌋ stand for the largest integer not exceeding x, while
⌈x⌉ stand for the smallest integer not less then x. We deﬁne:










Assume for the moment that l1 + 4K < l2 (see Lemma 1).
By the CRT any message M of the length contained in the
interval (l1 + K, l1 + 4K) ⊂ (l1, l2) is represented uniquely
by the values of the residue classes: Mi j mod Ni j for j =
1,2, ...t.
If M has the length k greater or equal to l1 + 4K we can
divide it on the suitable messages of length l1 + K and
at most one message of length less than l1 + K. For the
message M of length k < l1 +K we shall apply the message
padding procedure (desribed, e.g., in [8] in the framework
of hash functions). Namely we require M to be represented
by Mt according to the following steps:
1. Select a random number l ∈ (l1 + 3K, l1 + 4K).
2. Add l − k−⌈log2 (l1 + K)⌉ random bits to the mes-
sage M (at the left side).
3. Add ⌈log2(l1 + K)⌉ bits (at the right – hand side)
denoting the length of the original message M (this
part will contain a few zeros, since the length of M
requires only ⌈log2 k⌉ bits).
After the pading phase the message Mt is built of three
parts:
Random
Message M Bits denotingbits the length of M
l− k−⌈log2(l1 + K)⌉ k ⌈log2(l1 + K)⌉
Lemma 1. Let n ≥ 3, 1 ≤ t ≤ n and N0 > max(2n
2
,2500).
Assume that the RSA moduli satisfy the condition (∗) (see
Subsection 3.1) and let K satisfying (∗∗) be ﬁxed.
Then l1 +4K < l2 and Mt contains at least K random bits.
Proof. By (∗) and (∗∗) we obtain that l2 − l1 ≥ log2 N0 −
(t −1)(n− t + 1) = log2 N0 − n
2−1
4 ≥ log2 N0 −
n2
4 .
Therefore by the lower bound for N0 and the upper bound
for K we obtain that l1 + 4K < l2. Moreover, by the lower
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bound (∗∗) for K the number of random bits in Mt is at
least l − k− log2(l1 + K) > l1 + 3K− (l1 + K)−K > K as
required. 
From the above we see that each fragment of M of length
l1 +K has the K-bit margin against the possible decryption
of the message by any group of at most t−1 members of G.
On the other hand, the fragment of M of length < l1 + K
has, after the padding procedure, the corresponding margin
of size K according to minimum K random bits in Mt .
Finally, let us also remark that the length of Mt is chosen
randomly in the interval of length K.
4. Encryption and Decryption
Algorithms
4.1. Encryption
To send the encrypted message M to the group G the fol-
lowing steps are performed by the sender:
1. Select the threshold level t (t ≤ n).
2. Create the Mt from M according to the description
in Subsection 3.2.
3. Using the public keys belonging to group members
compute
ci ≡ Meit mod Ni for i = 1,2, ...,n.
4. With the aid of CRT compute C such that C ≡
ci mod Ni for i = 1,2, ...,n.
5. Send the cryptogram (C,t) to the group G.
Remark 1. For the sake of complexity the values of Ni
and Yi (see Subsection 2.1) used in the Step 4 above should
be precomputed and published for the users in advance.
4.2. Decryption
Decryption of the given ciphertext runs as follows:
1. Group members who decide to decrypt the message
compute
mi = Cdi mod Ni and publish the triple ((C,t),mi) on
the GMB.
2. When t triples occur on GMB any member can com-
bine the fragments and reconstruct the plaintext Mt
(and then the original message M).
4.3. Modification
In the above model all the users have the same rights in the
decryption process. However by the slight modiﬁcation in
the protocol the sender can have an impact on the choice
of the members (say from some set B ⊂ G) participating
in the decryption process. The modiﬁed protocol runs as
follows:
1. Select the threshold level t (t ≤ |B|).
2. Create the Mt from M following the procedure de-
scribed in Subsection 3.2.
3. Using the public keys belonging to group members
compute
ci ≡ Meit mod Ni for i ∈ B,
4. With the aid of CRT compute C such that C ≡
ci mod Ni for i ∈ B.
5. Send the cryptogram (C,t) to the group B.
If the message is declared only for users of B (and nobody
else should read it) they should distribute the correspond-
ing values among the group B (instead of publishing them
in GMB).
5. Conclusion
In the paper we presented a threshold decryption protocol
for the dynamic group based on the RSA cryptosystem and
CRT, with the full ﬂexibility of the threshold level. Our
model avoids the application of the classical Shamir secret
sharing protocol.
Instead we use some kind of formatting data technique
which allows to replace Shamir protocol by the CRT
method. The required ingredient was the application of
the well known padding methodology in our context. The
slight modiﬁcation of the principal model admits the im-
pact of the sender for the choice of the real receiver’s
group. The presented model can be extended for the more
general framework of the threshold decryption systems
(c.f. [10], [11]).
Appendix – an Example
In order to simplify the description we present the suitable
example omitting the data preparation phase in the protocol.
1. Let G = {P1,P2,P3}.
2. Values of the private and public keys belonging to
the members of G :
e1 = 17 d1 = 1289 N1 = 23 ·167 = 3841
e2 = 11 d2 = 3459 N2 = 59 ·83 = 4897
e3 = 13 d3 = 4501 N3 = 47 ·107 = 5029
3. The user S encrypts and sends the message M =
452009, with the threshold level t = 2 for the
group G.
4. Encryption:
c1 = 45200917 mod 3841 = 2053
c2 = 45200911 mod 4897 = 2197
c3 = 45200913 mod 5029 = 3845
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Parameters of the CRT:
N1 = 4897 ·5029 = 24627013
N2 = 3841 ·5029 = 19316389
N3 = 3841 ·4897 = 18809377
(N1)−1 mod N1 = 24627013−1 mod 3841 = 174
(N2)−1 mod N2 = 19316389−1 mod 4897 = 1973
(N3)−1 mod N3 = 18809377−1 mod 5029 = 2775
C = (2053 ·24627013 ·174+2197 ·19316389 ·1973
+3845 ·18809377 ·2775)mod 94592356933
= 79682507303
5. The user S sends the ciphertext (79682507303,2) to
the group G.
6. Users P1 and P2 decrypt the message:
m1=Cd1 mod N1=796825073031289mod 3841=2612
m2=Cd2 mod N2=796825073033459mod 4897=1485
Mt = 2612 ·4897 · (4897−1mod 3841)
+ 1485 ·3841 · (3841−1mod 4897)
= (2612 ·4897 ·3139
+ 1485 ·3841 ·895)mod 18809377
= 452009
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